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The Climax of Conflicts with Native
Americans in New Mexico
SPANISH AND MEXICAN ANTECEDENTS TO U.S. TREATI MAKING
DURING THE U.S.-MEXICO WAR,

1846-1848

Douglas W. Richmond

W

hat was the relationship of Spanish and Mexican Indian policy in
New Mexico to the agreements that the United States hammered
out with southwestern tribes during the U.S.-Mexico War ending in 1848?
Compared to Spanish and Mexican efforts throughout New Mexico, the
United States acted swiftly, negotiated treaties from a stronger position, and
immediately began to preserve order. The treaties that the United States
negotiated with Navajos and other tribes during its conflict with Mexico
determined the status of many of the region's indigenous peoples for the
next one hundred years.
Spanish, Mexican, and U.S. Indian policy in New Mexico evolved from
movements to conquer, colonize, or incorporate the region. All three nations wanted to exploit wealth, develop markets, protect settlers, and defeat
hostile international and Native rivals. However, crucial differences in policies, applications, and resources resulted in long Spanish hegemony, constant frustration for Mexico, and a comparatively swift victory by the United
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States. Spain initiated a comprehensive and long-term program to incorporate indigenous peoples into the broad pattern of Hispanic life, but Native
resentment against Spanish cruelties never dissipated and helped fuel resistance to total assimilation. During the massive struggles for Mexican independence in the 181OS, the Spanish colonial system, including its Indian
policies, collapsed under political chaos and from institutional neglect. After 1821 the new Mexican government simply lacked the resources to restore
the Spanish system. Moreover, Mexico could not organize military forces to
subdue indigenous raiding on its far northern frontier. Relentlessly marching westward across North America during the first half of the nineteenth
century, the United States ultimately brought greater economic, political,
military, and demographic resources to bear against Native Americans in
New Mexico and the Southwest.
The Spanish Empire in New Mexico

In 1598 don Juan de Onate initiated long-term Spanish contact with indigenous peoples in New Mexico. After traveling northward from Santa Barbara, Mexico, along the Rio Grande, Onate and Franciscan missionaries
established San Gabriel, a colony across the river from the present-day Tewa
village of San Juan. On 7 July 1598, the first recorded assembly of thirtyeight Pueblo leaders granted Onate and his followers permission to settle
New Mexico and swore allegiance to the king of Spain. However, many
Pueblo villages resisted the Spanish colonizers because of labor exploitation, physical punishment, and restrictions placed on their religious practices. As governor of the Kingdom of New Mexico, Onate dealt brutally
with all rebellious Native communities. In January 1599, after the Acomas
resisted a Spanish intrusion in their mesa-top pueblo, a force of Onate's
troops assaulted and leveled the village. The governor ordered the amputation of one foot on each surviving male over the age of twenty-five, and
twenty-five years of servitude in the Spanish colony.
Between 1607 and 1610, as Onate moved the provincial capital about
thirty miles south from San Juan to Santa Fe and awaited the arrival of his
successor, he embarked on a vigorous campaign to Christianize the Pueblos. Indeed, for the next seventy-five years, Franciscan missions anchored
Spanish New Mexico. In 1630 the director of the missionary program reported that sixty thousand Indians had been converted and that ninety chapels
had been built. I
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A triennial mission caravan, running between Nueva Vizcaya and Santa
Fe, brought fresh supplies and a few new settlers. Missionary workshops
taught the Pueblos weaving, leatherwork, blacksmithing, and a variety of
other tasks. The Franciscans became disturbed by the persistence of Native
spiritual ceremonies, which they considered idolatrous. The Franciscans
whipped indigenous religious leaders, imposed European concepts about
sexuality, and executed repeat offenders. 2 The Pueblos waited for the right
moment to oust the Spanish.
The time for rebellion came in the late 1670s. Under the leadership of
Pope, a Tewa medicine man from San Juan, various Pueblos coordinated
plans to initiate a broad revolt. Pueblo ceremonial associations and the secret nature of those meetings enabled Pope to map the revolt's strategy and
enlist the aid of most Pueblo villages. Pope's general instructions were simple:
kill all friars and colonists at a specified time. Originally set for 11 August
1680, Pope advanced the assault one day forward when Spanish agents captured one of his couriers. Pueblo fury drove all surviving northern settlers
into Santa Fe, which came under siege by Pueblos and their Apache allies.
Eleven days later, the beleaguered colonists departed for the south. Twentyone Franciscan missionaries and nearly four hundred Spanish soldiers and
settlers perished under Pueblo assault. But the Pueblo rebels did not attack
the retreating Spanish column, and in the absence of Spanish tyranny, unity
among the Pueblo villages broke down during the next twelve years. J In the
meantime, Spanish survivors and their Pueblo allies and servants established
communities in the El Paso del Norte area and awaited the response of the
Spanish crown to the Pueblo Revolt.
Don Diego de Vargas became governor of New Mexico in 1690. Two '
years later, launching from El Paso del Norte, he made a preliminary expedition into Pueblo zones to the north and obtained the formal submission
of twenty-three villages. Dissension among the Pueblos enabled the Spanish to recruit some Pueblos as allies, among them a substantial group of
Piros and Tewas who had followed the Spanish into exile in 1680. On 4
October 1693, Vargas left El Paso del Norte with eight hundred settlers and
soldiers. Despite promises to the contrary, he ordered the execution of seventy Pueblo leaders; he also turned over to the colonists a large number of
Pueblo families as slaves. 4
The Reconquest was a turning point in Spanish-Pueblo relations.

Dur~

ing his second term as governor (17°3-17°4), Vargas brought the Pueblos
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into a military partnership with the colonists against New Mexico's nomadic
tribes. Like Native allies of the Spanish elsewhere in New Spain, the Pueblos received food, weapons, and tools in return for their cooperation in wars
against the king's enemies. In addition, the Franciscans and civil authorities
modified their treatment of the Pueblos; coercive Spanish policies gave way
to more tolerance than Pueblos had experienced in the past. Vargas served
as godfather at baptisms ofthe sons and daughters of Pueblo leaders. Spanish authorities also took greater pains to protect indigenous legal rights.
The protector de indios (protector of the Indians), an individual appointed
to act on behalf of the Pueblos, gave them effective access to the Spanish
legal system. The Pueblos soon learned to operate Hispanic legal machinery, responding with vigor when their lands came under Spanish attack.
Thus, the communal outlook of Pueblo life persisted despite settler encroachments on Indian lands. 5
The Spanish slowly pacified much of New Mexico during the eighteenth
century. Christianizing sedentary tribes like the Pueblos remained a primary focus for colonization efforts there. Although the Spanish built twentyfive missions, approximately ten thousand Natives continued to live in their
thirty or so villages by the end of the eighteenth century. Spanish intermarriage with Native peoples, especially the Pueblos, increased the size of the
New Mexico settlement to eight thousand Spanish-Mexican colonists. Hardly
prosperous through much of the eighteenth century, New Mexico was at
least stable.
Although the Spanish had pacified the Pueblo region comprising central and western New Mexico, they encountered stiff resistance from other
tribes, specifically the nomads living on the colony's margins. The Navajos
had arrived in the Southwest shortly before the Spanish. Traditionally a
nomadic people, the Navajos modified many traditions after encountering
the Spanish and Pueblos. Becoming seminomads, the Navajos obtained
and raised Spanish horses, sheep, and cattle, and incorporated some Pueblo
ceremonies and myths into their own culture. To preserve peace, Spanish
law recognized Navajo land rights around Cebolleta Mountain, and the
Spanish made no serious efforts to subordinate the Navajos directly under
royal rule. Raiding, however, had been a mainstay of their warrior class; the
acquisition of the horse made the Navajos a military force to be reckoned
with. But the Navajos also faced attacks from nomadic neighbors. Living to
the east and south, their linguistic relatives, the Apaches, seized Navajo
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livestock. Under increasing pressure from Utes and Comanches to the north,
Navajo leaders journeyed to Santa Fe in 1706 to conclude peace with Spain.
In the early 17oos, the Apaches likewise came under attack from the
Comanches. 6
Spain's European rivals also created tensions by encouraging Native attacks against New Mexico. Lured by trading markets in the West and Southwest, the French entered the Missouri River area and moved onto the Great
Plains early in the eighteenth century. French traders introduced firearms
to various tribes, such as the Apaches, near New Mexico, upsetting the local
balance of power. At one point in the mid-eighteenth century, an alliance
between the Utes and Comanches seemed particularly threatening to New
Mexico, but they soon fought each other, with the Comanches triumphing.
Expanding their power on the central and southern plains, the Comanches
next scattered the normally pro-Spanish Jicarilla Apaches. Subsequent
Comanche pressure from the north forced the Faraon Apaches into eastern
New Mexico and the Lipan Apaches into southern New Mexic? and west
Texas. Comanche raiding, as well as trading, shrank Spain's northern frontier. However, the French defeat during the French and Indian War removed French interests from New Mexico's internal warfare in 1762.7
Domestic and imperial reforms finally provided peace treaties during
the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Under King Carlos III (17591788), Spain undertook efforts to strengthen her military, expand economic
growth, and improve royal administration. Increased imperial competition
in North America forced Carlos III to strengthen New Mexico as a buffer
zone that could protect the valuable mines of northern Mexico. To tie the
Southwest together, Spain eventually created a comandancia general (commandant general), a new administrative unit covering California, Sonora,
New Mexico, Coahuila, and Texas in 1776. Madrid hoped to consolidate
the Rockies, Plains, and Pacific Northwest under its control. Meanwhile,
ongoing conflict with the Apaches led to a deportation program that considerably weakened the numerous tribes. Reinforcements of well-trained regular Spanish army troops, whose coordinated campaigns increased military
pressure, forced Apaches, Navajos, and Comanches to sue for peace in 1775
and 1786. In return for annual gifts, food rations, horses, and supplies, warriors promised to honor these long-sought peace treaties. During the late
178os, the Comanche, Ute, and Navajo nations also enlisted in Spanish
armies as auxiliaries against defiant Apaches. Implicit in these treaties were
Spanish assurances that the king would protect each tribe from the others,
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unless a nation broke the truce. No trade with foreigners would be allowed.
In 1786, the Mexican viceroy established a system of reservations called
establecimientos de paz (peace establishments), which later became the
model for u.s. reservations in the nineteenth century. Worried about external challenges, Spanish officials appreciated Comanche and Apache reports of the movements of U.S. traders and trappers on the Great Plains. 8
The peace establishments represented a conscious turn away from mission
programs to trade relationships as the fundamental Spanish mechanism for
managing Indians in far northern New Spain.
As Spanish power began to fade in the first two decades of the nineteenth
century, colonial authorities had to pay special attention to Navajo challenges. The Navajo strategy after 1800 was to conduct raids on Spanish settlements and then request peace shortly afterward. The Spanish responded by
counterattacking in great strength at Canyon de Chelly, a principal Navajo
sanctuary, resulting in the chieftains' request for peace. Signed on 12 May

1805 at Jemez Pueblo, the peace treaty featured a Navajo promise that the
nation would not claim.the.Cebolleta area, that it would return Spanish
children and other captives seized earlier, that it would make no treaties
with nations hostile to Spain, and that it would punish Navajo raiders. In
return the Navajos received the right to trade with the Spanish, and to plant
crops and graze herds on their lands. Despite some individual clashes, the
Navajos seemed to comply with treaty terms, even turning over criminals to
the governor. In response the Spanish offered land in the hope that agriculture would become a permanent feature of Navajo life.9
During the twilight of Spanish rule in New Mexi~o, Gov. Facundo
Melgares concluded the empire's last major treaty, this time with the Navajos. After learning from a Navajo collaborator named JoaquIn that a Navajo
faction planned to attack the Spanish settlements, a preemptive campaign
againstthe militants triumphed in February 1819. Melgares appointed JoaquIn
general of all Navajos with the understanding that they would now devote
themselves to subsistence farming. Both Navajo and Spanish criminals were
to be handed over to Santa Fe officials. With the struggles for independence in Mexico and South America reaching a climax, the treaty struck on
31 October 1819 emphasized the absolute necessity for peace on the part of
the Navajos. In exchange the Spanish promised outright ownership oflands
that Navajos had been harvesting earlier on an informal basis, a measure
consistent with Spanish policy. Furthermore, Spanish authorities prohibited the grazing of Spanish cattle near Navajo fields to prevent livestock
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damage to Navajo farms. To cement the peace, both parties agreed to exchange four young men as hostages each year. Their upkeep would be paid
for by Spanish officials. The Spanish offered gifts of money to friendly, cooperative Navajo leaders if they complied with the. treaty over the long term. 1O
New Mexico under the Mexican Republic

During Mexico's struggle for independence in the 181OS, a wave of republican fervor swept through New Mexico. As Spain fought against French invaders in Iberia as well as colonial rebels in northern Mexico, New Mexico
was cut off from government supplies and trade commodities traditionally
sent north from Chihuahua. In the meantime, Anglo traders from Missouri
began to trade with Indians on the northern fringe of New Mexico, in clear
violation of Spanish prohibitions. When Mexico won its independence in
1821, New Mexican authorities opened the province's borders to Anglo traders and merchants. Businessmen from Missouri instantly beat a path to New
Mexico, inaugurating the Santa Fe trade. Ox- and mule-drawn wagon trains-quickly carved out trade routes to Santa Fe and then to Chihuahua'. Those
who benefited most from the new econoinic activity were the merchants
and landowners of New Mexico.
One month after Emperor Agustin Iturbide assumed power in Mexico
City, Governor Melgares had to send out another expedition against the
Navajos. The 1819 treaty had been casual in terms of interpreting its provisions and making good on promises, but Melgares signed a new peace treaty
with the Navajos on 29 October 1822. The new accord featured a reciprocal
exchange of captives, freedom for the Navajos to trade and travel throughout New Mexico, and the appointment of a new general, provided that the
Navajos would accept Segundo as their national leader. However, Melgares
never exchanged the captives, probably because Jose Antonio Vizcarra succeeded him as governor before the year 1822 ended. Under Vizcarra, Mexican policy in New Mexico emphasized the conquest of indigenous nations.
Thus, Vizcarra sent the Navajos an ultimatum demanding the return of
enslaved captives, conversion to Catholicism, and resettlement in villages
around missionsY The new governor ignored the fact that previous Spanish
attempts to resettle the Navajos had failed. The new treaty foundered, and
both sides prepared for conflict.
Still, Governor Vizcarra was able to sign a more imaginative treaty shortly
afterward. The governor mobilized a substantial force of fifteen hundred
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troops to campaign throughout New Mexico, leading the Navajos to agree
to peace on 20 January 1824. The accord is notable for stipulations calling
for a reciprocal exchange of Navajo and Nuevomexicano captives. Another
clause promised the release of Navajo captives held in Mexico City. Article
6 required Navajo headmen to compel their people to give up stolen Mexican property. Article 7 went so far as to "ask for the aid of local authorities"
if Nuevomexicanos stole property from Navajos. The major problem was
that chronic labor shortages pressured Nuevomexicanos to capture and enslave Indians and to receive indigenous slaves - particularly children - from
Native trade partners in exchange for horses. Although Mexican law forbade slavery, local officials sanctioned it anyway. From the perspective of
some Native tribes, human captives were almost as valuable as horses as
compensation for individuals lost in warfare and as trade itemsY
The Mexican governor in New Mexico also concluded a treaty with the
Comanches in August 1826. Both sides agreed that the Pecos River would
be the limit of Comanche occupation and that the Comanches could not
pass over the right bank without informing Mexican officials. In return for
subsistence commerce, the Comanches promised not to disrupt the roads
between Santa Fe and Missouri and to aid trade caravans as much as possible. The governor promised to reestablish the Spanish practice of gift distribution in Santa Fe but never followed throughY Meanwhile, the Apaches
began to raid south into Sonora and Chihuahua.
Once Mexico began administrating New Mexico, the territory's relations
with the indigenous groups broke down. As financial and political turbulence weakened the young Mexican republic, many of the formidable Spanish institutions crumbled. The independence movement completely
disrupted the Spanish establecimientos de paz, and the Spanish and Mexican abandonment of the missions and presidios weakened frontier defenses
against Native assaults. Mexico still recognized land grants conceded to
Pueblos by the Spanish crown, but the new republic, as well as state governments, enacted legislation that weakened the legal protections of indigenous
land and water rights.
Another problem was the collapse of the old alliance between New
Mexico and the Comanches, Utes, Navajos, and Jicarilla Apaches, a cooperative arrangement that Spanish administrators had cultivated carefully
during the late eighteenth century. Rations to pacify the Comanches and
Apaches dwindled. Violence among Apaches, Comanches, Navajos, and
New Mexicans increased during the 183os. New Mexico could field only
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nine hundred regulars and militia by the middle of the decade. In the Tucson area, Apaches began to gain the upper hand by the 1840s. Regular Mexican armies and informal armed groups invaded Navajo territory in search of
livestock and slaves. Impoverished members of the Navajo nation continued to rely on raiding to increase their wealth despite the attempts of their
elders to work out peaceful relations. Anxious Pueblos, often the victims of
Navajo expansion, allied themselves with any military force that would lash
out against Navajos.14
Restoring peace was a perplexing problem for Mexico. The pattern of
raiding, tranquility, and further conflict had characterized the northern frontier since the Spanish arrived in the late sixteenth century. War with Spain
and the Comanches pushed the Utes off the buffalo plains, forcing them to
plunder sedentary Spanish Mexicans in order to flesh out their economic
subsistence. Indians armed with rifles obtained from unscrupulous French,
Anglo, and even Mexican traders were difficult for New Mexicans to deal
with. The use of rifles in annual hunts led Plains Indians to overharvest
bison herds, on which their survival and independence depended. As a result, Navajos, Utes, and Apaches intensified their raiding. Disturbed by the
sale of intoxicating beverages to indigenous groups, the civil governor,
Donaciano Vigil, considered allowing local Nuevomexicanos to purchase
weapons from the North Americans to defend themselves. 15 Speaking out
against this policy, Padre Antonio Jose Martinez urged a humane approach
to New Mexico Indian policy. During the Mexican and early U.S. periods,
the outspoken pastor from Taos became a major figure in the territory's
-political affairs, consistently urging Native freedom, tolerance, and education. 16 His response to the unsettled state of tribal-Mexican relations was to
write an exposicion (interpretation) arguing for the human rights of indigenous peoples. Among other things, the padre's brilliant an~lysis of the situation stated:
Although the vast uncultivated fields of Mexico are deserted, they were
once occupied by these wild nations, and it was formerly observed that,
at a time anterior to the Mexican empire, they were inhabited by an
intelligent, numerous, and industrial people, the aborigines of our
republic. 17
Specifically, Padre Martinez proposed that all Indians be induced to live in
Mexican society, to cultivate lands as farmers and ranchers, to develop arts
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and industries, and to adhere to the rest of the republican institutions established by Mexico. More than anything else, the padre steadfastly believed
that education would assimilate and stimulate indigenous communities.
Printing the exposici6n on his own press, the padre distributed it to influentialleaders inside and outside New Mexico. A copy even went to Mexican
president Gen. Antonio L6pez de Santa Anna. 18
Mexico enjoyed peaceful relations more with the Pueblos than with any
other Natives in New Mexico. The Pueblos were an important group because they comprised nearly one-third of New Mexico's population, 43,433
souls by 1827. Particularly critical to Mexican control was the public display of at least a nominal Catholicism by large numbers of Pueblos. In
the Spanish tradition, Mexican authorities allowed the Pueblos to maintain their own religious customs as well as to enjoy a loose autonomy over
their villages. 19
On the other hand, the Navajos gradually gained the upper hand in their
frequent conflict with New Mexicans during the Mexican period. The pastoral and semisedentary Navajos raided northward into Ute country and
eastward into the upper and middle Rio Grande. Gov. Manuel Armijo (1827-

1829 and 1837-1844), a native Nuevomexicano, rejected Navajo overtures
until they signed a peace treaty in July 1839. Like the Spanish, Armijo appointed a single spokesman for the entire Navajo nation-a representative
who in turn would be under the authority of a Mexican prefect. The Mexicans, maintaining a hardnosed position, insisted that they be allowed to
keep their Navajo captives but that Mexican prisoners of the Navajos be
returned. Under Armijo's policy, Navajos who committed murder would
have to be surrendered to Mexican authorities. The Navajos objected to
that stipulation, fearing that those Navajos found guilty of murder would be
hanged by the Mexicans. If a Mexican sheepherder killed a Navajo, he
would pay an indemnity of thirty sheep to the victim's family and be punished according to Mexican law. The 1839 treaty also attempted to deal with
the vexing slavery issue by stating that Navajo families that escaped from
their masters would be free upon arrival in their homeland. 20 Since no exchange of hostages took place, peace was doomed by October 1839. The
Navajos resumed the fighting, demanding the return of slaves seized by
Mexican military expeditions.
Armijo finally decided that an offer of local autonomy, similar to that
enjoyed by Pueblos, would yield positive results, particularly when the Navajos learned that their autonomy had the sanction of the executive office in
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Santa Fe. The Mexicans also offered monetary. rewards, but the Navajos
spurned the enticement of "a small gratification" in return for the·Mexican
ratification of four chieftains elected by Navajo tribes. 21 Exercising the autonomy already in their hands, the Navajos would have nothing to do with
Mexicans passing judgment on their leaders.
By 1841 Mexican military commanders obtained agreements for open
trade between Navajo and Mexican communities, a policy that had been a
long-standing Navajo goal. The Navajos pledged themselves to establishing
a sedentary lifestyle, a desire of Padre MartInez. After both sides decided to
free captives and sign a series of treaties in 1841, the Mexicans hoped that
the turbulent New Mexican frontier had finally become stabilized. A mutual promise not to capture slaves seemed to offer the territory some hope.
Governor Armijo undoubtedly heaved a sigh of relief when he received an
optimistic report that, in return for permission to pasture their animals freely,
the Navajos were "dedicating themselves to planting on the banks of the
Puercos River, very close to the frontier."22 Violence and raiding returned,
however, when the Navajos released their captives and the Mexicans refused to reciprocate. 2l
Two years later, additional peace efforts met a similar fate. Jose Sarracino,
inspector of the New Mexico militia, reported to the new governor, Juan
Andres Archuleta, that several Navajo leaders wanted peace, despite the
robberies committed by younger, more aggressive Navajo warriors. To cultivate and maintain peace, Sarracino recommended giving cooperative Navajo chiefs the land that they had solicited during earlier negotiations. In
return, the Mexicans obtained a Navajo pledge of assistance on a projected
military campaign against Apaches and Utes to the north and east. Military
cooperation became imperative for Navajos as well as Mexicans because
Apaches and Utes were an ongoing threat to Sonora and Navajo country.24
The new peace treaty, ratified on 23 March 1844, also offered Navajos the
possibility of settling in and, opening trad~ with Mexican villages. The Nava;os agreed to reward those concessions by allowing their Mexican captives to return to Mexican-controlled areas. Mexican authorities still refused
to release Navajo prisoners, but a new provision gave Navajos the option to
pay a ransom for the liberation of Navajo slaves held by Mexicans. Although
Mexican authorities warned that further Navajo raiding would result in a
general war, Article 7 of the treaty addressed Mexican fears of its northern
neighbor: "When the enemies of the Mexican republic and those of the
Navajo tribe try to make war upon them, the contracting parties remain
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obligated to impede the aggression or to give prompt news in order to free
them from it."25 The provision essentially outlined a mutual defense pact
against the United States, an expansive country that threatened to inundate
all nations lying across its path.
Mexican hopes of an alliance with Native nations against U.S. expansion
and its ability to formulate relatively successful treaties soon crashed on familiar problems. On the eve of the U.S.-Mexico War, Native warriors again
would not honor the treaties and began to attack ranches, villages, and farms.
The Navajos became particularly active late in the spring of 1843, killing
settlers, carrying women and children into slavery, and stealing hundreds of
cattle and sheep. Likewise, the Utes began attacking settlements in New
Mexico. 26 Even under such dire conditions, Nuevomexicanos looked in vain
for military aid from the central government, which political factionalism
and turmoil crippled during the early 1840s.

The U.S. Hegemony
Uprooting Natives east of the Mississippi River and relocating them to the
West was U.S. Indian policy prior to the war with Mexico. Labeled the Great
American Desert in the early 1820S, those lands lying west of Arkansas, Missouri, and the Missouri River were designated the Permanent Indian Frontier by U.S. policymakers. Presidents from James Monroe to John Tyler
established this frontier in an attempt to encourage westward settlement
while confining indigenous tribes to less desirable areas and opening up
new lands for U.S. settlers.
The Permanent Indian Frontier, once thought to be the solution to the
indigenous dilemma, collapsed after the United States declared war on
Mexico in 1846. Under Polk's orders, the Army of the West, commanded by
Brig. Gen. Stephen W. Kearny, successfully conquered and occupied New
Mexico and California, and ambitious Anglo settlers followed in its wake
over the next decade. These new settlers damaged indigenous sanctuaries
in the Permanent Indian Frontier. 27 The U.S. government also chipped away
at the Native zone by laying claim to large tracts of land. It quickly became
apparent to Navajos and other southwestern tribes that the U.S. Army operated under two agendas: to defeat Mexico and claim Mexican or Indian
territory for the United States.
The results of White migration and decisions by U.S. officials to protect
their citizens from their indigenous neighbors motivated the Army of the
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West to negotiate peace treaties with the tribes. Although more successful
than similar attempts by Spain and Mexico, failure to enforce the terms of
the treaties produced hostilities that doomed the indigenous communities
to a lifestyle like the one they had lived before US. forces arrived. Washington, D.C., recognized these problems to a certain degree and compelled
the Bureau of Indian Affairs to respond.
Polk's election to the presidency as an advocate of national expansion in
1844 predetermined the outcome of Indian policy in the Southwest. Virtually everyone in Washington, D.C., understood Polk's well-advertised objectives for acquiring new territories beyond the Mississippi River. As he
settled the Oregon dispute with Britain during spring 1846, Polk turned his
attention toward obtaining Mexican California and New Mexico. Thus,
after the declaration of war on Mexico, Polk surprised nobody when he sent
the Army of the West under Kearny toward Santa Fe. By means of a confidential message from the War Department, Polk directed the Army of the
West to march along the Santa Fe Trail and occupy New Mexico. Upon
consolidating U.S. power there, Kearny was to lead a portion of his army
overland to claim California for the United States. Kearny's army of sixteen
hundred regulars and volunteers-the latter under the command of Col.
Alexander W. Doniphan -departed from Fort Leavenworth on the Missouri
River in June 1846 and began to move into New Mexico that August. z8 Kearny
marched ahead of Doniphan in order to secure Santa Fe. Merchant caravans bound for Santa Fe and Mexican towns and cities farther south followed obediently behind the US. column.
When Kearny arrived at Las Vegas, New Mexico, the first Mexican village on the Santa Fe Trail, he decided to declare the terms of US . occupation. After excitedly dismounting his horse and clambering onto the roof of
a prominent house, Kearny asserted his government's claim to New Mexico
and encouraged the residents of Las Vegas to swear an oath ofloyalty to the
United States. With the threat of armed force behind him, Kearny felt satisfied that the Nuevomexicanos would bow to his wishes. 29
But what about the Indians? Would they force Kearny to carry out a dangerous attack against them? To gauge the possibility of Native resistance,
Kearny also sent troops ahead of the main column to gather information.
They reported that "the Pueblos, Yutas and other Indian tribes, to the number of 5,000, had combined with the New Mexicans to oppose our march,
and that they would annoy our lines every day."30 Meanwhile, rumors from
all sides insisted that various Pueblo factions within New Mexico would
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join Mexican forces to expel the U.S. invaders. Such gossip proved to be
unfounded. On the other hand, Mexican authorities feared that U.S. military leaders would attempt to incite Indians against Mexico. At this stage,
however, the Pueblos, historically divided among themselves, were reluctant to engage in any hostilities, and their loyalty to Mexico was doubtful.
Instead, many Pueblos favored an accommodation with the Army of the
West. As U.S. troops approached Santa Fe in mid August, a Pueblo chief
informed Kearny that "Governor Armijo had visited Taos and persuaded
the Pueblos to join his army; but the wise men of the Pueblos ... told
Armijo that it was useless to fight the Americans."31 This discussion and
others like it throughout Pueblo country played a significant role in the
United States gaining control over New Mexico during the summer and
fall of 1846.
By the time Kearny reached the Mexican army's encampment, it had
fled. Meanwhile, U.S. merchants with business ties to Santa Fe, particularly George T. Howard and James W. Magoffin, had been collecting covert intelligence at the request of the U.S. government. As the Army of the
West entered New Mexico, the War Department ordered Magoffin and
Howard to persuade Governor Armijo not to fight the U.S. troops. With a
caravan of wagons carrying over a million dollars' worth of champagne,
claret, and other merchandise, Magoffin arrived in Santa Fe under a truce
flag and likely persuaded Armijo to withdraw and accept U.S. annexation.
The Mexican commander of Tucson withdrew his troops five months later
in December 1846.32 Indeed, the Army of the West entered Santa Fe without opposition on 18 August 1846. By then, Armijo had fled south to Chihuahua with his Mexican regulars.
These events help explain why Kearny and his forces marched unopposed into Santa Fe and enjoyed peace for the remainder of the year. After
his arrival, Kearny clarified the terms of U.S. occupation. Speaking to the
citizens on the Santa Fe plaza, Kearny emphasized that his army had come
as friends of the Nuevomexicanos, that New Mexico had become part of
the United States, that Nuevomexicanos were now U.S. citizens, and that
U.S. authorities and troops would observe the right of religious freedom in
New Mexico. Moreover, he promised that no theft or homicide would be
tolerated by the United States. When his address concluded, Kearny attended a Catholic mass and hosted a dance. Shortly afterward, Pueblo chiefs
arrived in Santa Fe to declare their allegiance to the United States. Four
days after his initial arrival, Kearny also warned that resistance to his author-
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ity would be "folly or madness."33 In late September, sensing that New Mexico
was relatively secure, Kearny began the long march westward with the battalion of First Dragoons. Colonel Doniphan remained behind with the
Missouri volunteers in Santa Fe and considered an attack on Chihuahua.
Clearly, many Nuevomexicanos supported U.S. annexation out of their
assumption that the U.S. army would control Native Americans in New
Mexico better than the Mexican government had. To the Mexican population as well as U.S. authorities, the Navajos emerged as the primary threat to
peace and stability. As several hundred settlers arrived in New Mexico from
other parts of the United States, the Navajos resumed their raids on New
Mexican settlements. The Navajos had no intention to wipe out Mexican
or Anglo settlers, because the settlements offered easy access to sheep and
cattle. 34 However, U.S. authorities believed that, to keep the Mexican American citizens compliant, the Navajos had to be pacified.
The migration of Whites into and across Indian homelands became the
foremost difficulty for the U.S. government in New Mexico. The problem
became more serious because there were already settlers living on and around
indigenous lands. As the Army of the West moved through Apache territory
toward California, settlers took possession of localities previously labeled as
"Indian land." This became the main factor that instigated various tribes to
raid settlements. 35 Navajo refusal to stop raiding, despite the presence of the
Missouri volunteers, inevitably forced Kearny to conclude that the Navajos
had become an impediment to the imposition of U.S. authority in New
Mexico. Since Kearny had pledged his protection to New Mexicans, he
had to act. 36
Kearny selected the unhappy Missouri volunteers to pacify the Navajos.
On 16 September, Kearny ordered Doniphan to organize a peace council
with the Navajos. Already discouraged from not having been paid,
Doniphan's soldiers became upset by this delay, which now diverted them
from their plan to attack Chihuahua. The Missouri volunteers were anxious to engage the Mexican garrison in Chihuahua, not the Navajos in western New Mexico. 37
Near Socorro, New Mexico, Kearny sent his order to Doniphan to march
against the Navajos. Specifically, Kearny instructed Doniphan to "send a
military expedition }nto the country of those [Navajo] Indians, to secure a
peace and better conduct from them in the future." Furthermore, Doniphan
was to obtain from the Navajos "all the prisoners, and all the property they
hold, which may have been stolen from the inhabitants of the territory of
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New Mexico, to be given up and he will require of them such security of
their future good conduct as he may think ample and sufficient."JS Therefore, Doniphan's expedition assumed the responsibility to protect U.S. citizensincluding Nuevomexicanos-and their interests from the real or perceived
threat of indigenous attack.
Peace negotiations from a position of strength became imperative to consolidate Kearny's victory. Mter ordering Doniphan's regiment into Navajo
territory, Kearny also encouraged New Mexicans, Anglo and Hispanic, to
wage war on the Navajos. His proclamation advised the settlers "to form war
parties, to march into the country of their enemies, the Navajos, to recover
their property, to make reprisals and obtain redress for the many insults
received from them."39 Thus, in this aggressive atmosphere, Doniphan's forces
sought to fashion a peace treaty with the Navajos.
The atrocities committed by the Missouri volunteers and accompanying
civilian militia against the Navajos are not precisely known. However, Charles
Bent, Kearny's appointed civil governor of New Mexico, registered his displeasure to Doniphan. Upon receiving numerous complaints of the "insubordinate and often oppressive and abusive conduct" of Doniphan's troops,
Bent ordered the colonel to "interpose your authority to compel the soldiers
to respect the rights of the inhabitants."40 The volunteers who served under
Doniphan wrote glowingly about his conduct, but Bent's letter indicates a
quite different reality.
With winter beginning in the mountains, Doniphan realized that his
campaign would have to be quick as well as decisive. His three companies
split up to scout for Navajos in the mountains and agreed to rendezvous at
Ojo del Oso near present-day Gallup. Dressed i~ little but summer clothing, Doniphan's troops suffered from cold, exposure, and typhoid fever.
Several men died during the operation. With the aid of Maj. William Gilpin,
Doniphan's forces made contact with Narbona, the leader of the Navajo
faction that had indicated a desire for peace. Other Navajos claimed that
they had signed preliminary understandings with Doniphan's subordinates.
The colonel urged them to come to Ojo del Oso as soon as possible. As the
volunteers made their way to the meeting place, they marched through
snow that was almost waist deep. Upon reaching Ojo d~l Oso, they were
relieved to find that the significant chiefs from each clan had arrived. Also
present were other subordinate Navajo leaders and warriors, a total of about
five hundred Indians. 41
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As Doniphan negotiated his treaty with the Navajos, he outlined the new
relationship between the United States and the indigenous peoples of New
Mexico. He offered little doubt as to what awaited those who would resist:
"We now have full possession of New Mexico ... when they [Navajos] now
stole property from the New Mexicans, they were stealing from us [U.S.
government]; and when they killed them [New Mexicans], they were killing our people ... this would not be suffered any longer; it would be greatly
to their advantage for Americans to settle in New Mexico."41 Sarcilla Largo
was one of the few Navajos to respond defiantly:
Americans! You have a strange cause for war against the Navajos.
We have waged war against the New Mexicans for several years....
We had just cause for all this. You have lately commenced a war
against the same people.... You have therefore conquered them, the
very thing we have been attempting to do for so many years. You now
turn upon us for attempting to do what you have done yourselves. 43
To some Navajos, whose people had waged war on first the Spanish and
then the Mexicans for well over a hundred years, Doniphan's demands
seemed ludicrous and outrageous.
The majority of the other Navajos present at Ojo del Oso, however, expressed a strong desire for peace. Doniphan reciprocated by inviting young
Navajos to learn a trade in the United States. Their intelligence, he explained, enabled them to learn civilized skills that would help develop the
Navajo people. Several Navajos offered to accompany Doniphan' back to
Missouri but reconsidered when they learned that Doniphan would soon
march his troops southward to attack Chihuahua. Once Sarcilla Largo concluded that the Navajos had no desire to fight the United States, the two
sides signed the following treaty:
Article 1. A firm and lasting peace and amity shall henceforth exist
between the American people and the Navajo tribe ofIndians.
Article 2. The people of New Mexico and the Pueblo tribe ofIndians
are included in the term "American people."
Article 3. A mutual trade, as between people of the same nation, shall
be carried on between these several parties; the Americans,Mexicans,
and Pueblos being free tovisit all portions of the Navajo country, and
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the Navajos all portions of the American country without molestation,
and full protection shall be mutually given.
Article 4- There shall be a mutual restoration of all prisoners, the
several parties being pledged to redeem by purchase such as may not
be exchanged each for each.
Article 5. All property taken by either party from the other, since the
18th of August last, shall be restored. 44
The treaty provisions indicate the durability ofIndian policy issues in the
Southwest. Over the course of nearly two and a half centuries, Spain, Mexico,
and the United States managed to work out trade understandings with Natives, but only Spanish and U.S. officials secured the return of prisoners
held by them. Unlike Mexico, Spain and the United States eventually
brought their military superiority to bear in winning somewhat durable treaty
understandings. Although contemporary scholars such as Hubert H. Bancroft
considered Doniphan's treaty, signed on 22 November 1846, a meaningless
gesture, it enabled the Army of the West to initiate U.S. control over New
Mexico. 45 The treaty did not, however, end Navajo resistance, which would
continue for another seventeen years.
As with virtually all other treaties between U.S. representatives and indigenous groups, Doniphan's treaty with the Navajos decidedly favored the
United States. The federal government in Washington, D.C., now claimed
New Mexico and its Navajo lands. The treaty also obligated the Navajos, by
threat of superior armed force, to a peace that many considered contradictory. It also represented the first U.S. treaty concluded with Indians inside
the old Mexican frontier. This crucial 'initial step helped lay the groundwork for future U.S. Indian policy in the American West after the U.S.Mexico War.
Other tribes in New Mexico also gave in to the United States. The Utes
had already agreed to peace terms with Doniphan on 15 October 1846. Mter
signing the treaty at Ojo del Oso, Doniphan and three Navajo chiefs completed a sixty-mile journey to meet with the Zunis, with whom the Navajos
were at war. Although the Zunis and Navajos bickered with one another,
Doniphan persuaded them to sign peace treaties at Zuni Pueblo on 26 November. Eventually, however, ongoing hostilities would move the military
governor of New Mexico to issue the Zunis fifty muskets with which to
defend themselves against the Navajos. Because the Hopis far to the west
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remained quiet, Doniphan considered them compliant enough not to bother
visiting. In general, the Pueblos remained largely unopposed to U.S. occupation. But the heads of New Mexican municipal governments began to try
asserting authority over Pueblo villages, while Mexican and U.S. claimants
questioned the right of Pueblo villages to the ownership of highly desirable
agricultural and grazing lands. Despite the proximity of U.S. authorities in
Santa Fe to Pueblos in the Rio Grande Valley and to the west, the United
States never signed a treaty with any Pueblo tribes. 46
Traditional animosities between Mexico and the Apaches minimized the
threat of prolonged warfare between Kearny and the Apaches. The Mexican states of Chihuahua and Sonora had been so plagued by Apache raids
that they began offering generous bounties on Apache scalps, which degenerated into a gruesome industry. Soon, not only Mexicans but also Anglo
Americans, runaway slaves, and other indigenous tribes took part in the scalp
trade sponsored in northern Mexico. Therefore, the Apaches could distinguish the Army of the West as potential allies when it approached the Apache
domain. Not surprisingly, Apache chief Mangas Coloradas contacted Kearny
to propose a treaty that would unite both their nations to battle the Mexi- .
cans. Kearny accepted gladly the Apache promise not to raid the Anglo
settlers, but the general declined the proposed joint campaign with the
Apaches because he had to campaign in California and likely distrusted the
ApachesY
Doniphan, however, retaliated when Apaches threatened the movements
of his Missouri volunteers. Fighting the Apaches cemented Doniphan's relations with some Mexican communities that had normally avoided all contact with Apaches. But when Nuevomexicano com~unities realized that
Doniphan's force could check Apache raiders, if not intimidate them, they
changed their minds. When Apaches stole mules and other stock, Mexican
communities participated with Doniphan's troops in counterattacks against
the Apaches. 48 However, the Missouri volunteers never engaged the Apaches
or the Navajos, despite Kearny's orders to subdue them.
Governor Bent, meanwhile, decided to relay information on the Native
populations to Sec. of State James P. Buchanan. Bent urged the government to take "immediate action" on what he considered eight "powerful
tribes" including Comanches, Utes, Navajos, and others. He argued, "Until
these Indians are effectually subdued, they will continue to blight the prosperity of that portion of this Territory which is exposed to their depredations." Treaty making was obviously of the highest necessity, but the U.S.
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government could "scarcely" count on the Indians enforcing "any peace
they may make until they have been made to feel the strength of our government."49 On 10 November 1846, Bent provided the U.S. commissioner
of Indian affairs with valuable demographic data showing that nearly forty
thousand indigenous peoples living in almost seven thousand lodges in the
New Mexico region now fell under U.S. supervision. He concluded, "It
becomes a subject of serious import how the numerous and savage tribes
are to be controlled and managed."50 Governor Bent's conclusions foretold
future military campaigns against southwestern Natives who failed to keep
the peace and to comply with U.S. Indian policy.
Doniphan's expedition, in conjunction with the Army of the West, is a
vivid illustration of how the U.S.-Mexico War affected Indian policy and
indigenous peoples. Whether Kearny or Doniphan realized the irrevocable
consequences of their policies and operations is unknown. Federal officials
directly associated with the formulation of Indian policy grasped the implications and drew up measures to deal with the acquisition of new territories
and the inhabitants residing within those areas. Thus, U.S. military protection of its citizens and economic interests initiated the changes that led to
the modification ofIndian policy drafted in Washington, D.C. The purpose
of treaty making, which followed the suppression of Indian threats, defined
relations between indigenous groups and the federal government. 51 The treaty
process, therefore, imposed obligations and limitations upon New Mexico
tribes at the convenience of the federal government. Doniphan's expedition
clearly illustrates the patterns of Indian-White relations that had been developing for over two hundred years.
Although the U.S. conquerors attempted to stop the outright enslavement of Native peoples throughout the Southwest, they responded to Natvies
by considering them childish and unworthy of equality or full civil rights.
U.S. authorities in California and New Mexico urged apprehensive Indian
leaders to trust their new government. But the treaties or agreements with
the indigenous populations did not prepare Kearny, Doniphan, or other U.S.
leaders for the impact that their new hegemony would have on the Native
populations in the Southwest. A simple desire for peace and their overly optimistic belief in future harmony would not be enough to preserve order. 52
Doniphan soon learned that his Navajo treaty was not having its desired
effect. Before he left New Mexico for Chihuahua, he received reports that
the Navajos had resumed raiding the settlements. In 1847 Indians killed an
estimated 47 Americans, destroyed 330 wagons, and butchered or dispersed
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about 6500 head of stock. Doniphan was either unaware of the history of
Navajo struggles against Mexico or simply ignored that historical legacy, for
he committed some of the same blunders that the Mexicans had. His insistence that the Navajos stop raiding seemed ridiculous to the Navajo leadership; Mexican and Ute forces never stopped attacking Navajo country in
search oflivestock and slaves. Subjected to such violence, the Navajos naturally struck back. For the next twenty years, Navajos endured a cycle of war·
and peace. After the US.-Mexico War, US. soldiers routinely entered the
Navajo homeland to wage war and enforce peace. The Navajos present at
the discussions with US. authorities would agree to peace terms, only to be
discredited by warriors who did not attend the talks. Hostilities eventually
resumed. 53
Despite the rapid conquest of Nuevomexicanos by the Army of the West
in August 1846, the occupation became a sanguinary affair within six months.
Dominated by agents of the American Party, the civil government formed
by Brigadier General Kearny included only two Hispanos, otherwise freezing out representatives of the leading New Mexican families. Although not
recognized by U.S. authorities, the Mexican legislature in New Mexico
continued to meet in defiance of the new US. order. Unruly U.S. troops,
the volunteers especially, abused and alienated New Mexican residents in
occupied towns and settlements. In December 1846, US. authorities unmasked a Nuevomexicano plot to smash the US. occupation government.
Consequently, political and social conditions in New Mexico were tense
and combustible when the new year opened.
The spark that touched off a Nuevomexicano revolt came when angry
Pueblos demanded the release of several jailed Taos residents in January
1847. Although treated fairly up to this point, the Pueblos would not accept
those arrests-arbitrary in their eyes-and rose up in rebellion to US. rule.
Rebels killed Governor Bent and six other individuals related to the American Party. Major battles between US. and insurgent forces at La Canada de
Santa Cruz and at Taos Pueblo attracted many Mexican participants. A fierce
US. assault eventually broke rebel resistance and killed dozens of fighters.
Formal executions of twenty-six Nuevomexicanos for taking up arms contrasted sharply with the justice generally delivered during the Spanish and
Mexican periods, when such executions were uncommon. Manuel Cortes,
a commissioned agent of the Mexican government, led in the Mora valley a
subsequent revolt that encouraged many villages in northern New Mexico
to rise up against the United States. Cortes's guerrillas attacked US. troops

76?

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

VOLUME 80, NUMBER I

on remote roads and in grazing camps and stole horses, mules, and cattle
throughout 1847. Thus, in the end, the U.S. conquest of New Mexico did
not entail the peaceful assimilation of the Nuevomexicanos envisioned by
President Polk and other U.S. policymakers. 54
By March 1847, those swift reprisals generally restored order to New
Mexico. The prisoners taken during the revolt were turned over to civil
authorities for trial. Twenty-five were discharged, the grand jury finding insufficient evidence to indict them. However, the grand jury accumulated
evidence enough to bring indictments for treason against four others. The
U.S. territorial court in New Mexico tried and convicted one for treason
and others for murdering Bent. Meanwhile, the court suspended the case of
one prisoner convicted of treason until the governor received word from
Washington, D.C., about whether such a charge could be sustained against
any inhabitant of New Mexico whose U.S. citizenship derived from Kearny's
proclamation of annexation. Well aware that Nuevomexicanos were in fact
still citizens of Mexico until an international treaty severed that tie, President
Polk wisely remitted the sentence of Antonio Maria Trujillo for treason. 55
Mter the United States and Mexico signed the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hildalgo ending their war, the U.S. government signed three additional
Navajo treaties from 1848 to 1851, but all failed. In May 1848, Col. Edward
W. B. Newby concluded a Navajo peace treaty that emphasized the return
of prisoners by both sides. A particularly sound provision mandated that
Nuevomexicanos stop raiding Navajo villages to take indigenous slaves and
retrieve stolen livestock. U.S. troops faced difficult conditions while attempting to enforce this treaty. One soldier complained of wolves howling around
his tent at night, martial law "severe to the extreme," and smallpox spreading throughout his camp "to a most alarming extent." He continued, "Many
men had died with it and a large number is [sic] now infected."56 His complaints presaged the trying mission of the U.S. Army to keep order in the Far
Southwest after the Mexican-American War.
An 1849 treaty by which the Navajos agreed to accept U.S. jurisdiction,
including trade and transport of goods, included pledges to stop their attacks on settlements and to surrender captives and stolen property. Although
the treaty did not deprive the Navajos of their authority to charge, try, and
punish tribal members of crimes, Navajo jurisdiction did not extend to
Anglos, Hispanos, and Indians of other tribes. Concluded by military governor Lt. Col. John M. Washington, this treaty mandated that the United
States designate Navajo territorial boundaries and apply policies that would
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enhance Navajo prosperity and happiness. To be precise, Navajo lands were
now annexed to New Mexico, with military posts soon to be established.
Although "donations, presents and implements" were promised them in
Article 10, the Navajos never complied with the stringent terms of the treaty
concluded with Lieutenant Colonel Washington. 57 In Washington, D.C.,
Congress refused to appropriate funds to fulfill the terms of the 1849 treaty.
U.S. Indian agents likewise negotiated a similar agreement with the Utes
that same year.
In October 1851, three years after the war with Mexico ended, Gov. James
S. Calhoun negotiated preliminary agreements with Zuni and Hopi leaders. Although the Navajos had rejected four peace proposals earlier that
spring, Calhoun surprised nearly everyone in the territory by meeting with
a Navajo council on Christmas Day 1851 at Jemez. Here, the Navajos actually turned over three hostages as the governor distributed about three thousand dollars' worth of gifts. Like the 1848 and 1849 treaties, this treaty
supposedly represented a "lasting peace" that never materialized. A year
later, a Gila Apache treaty contained pledges that the Indians would cease
raiding and taking captives in Mexico. At least three times, Indian agents in
New Mexico managed to return captives to Mexican custody.58
The cyclic pattern of war and peace and the continuous demands of
settlers for protection induced the U.S. Bureau ofIndian Affairs to devise a
new reservation system. William Medill, who had been appointed to the
position of commissioner of Indian affairs by Polk in 1845, found that his
office entailed more than the simple engagement of party politics. During
his first year, he was completely consumed with the dilemma over how to
manage the crises caused by the westward expansion. In his 1848 annual
report, one year after Doniphan departed New Mexico to conquer Chihuahua, Medill proposed a system that would pacify settlers as well as protect
indigenous tribes from "unsavory white influences." Medill's project would
have modified "Indian country to create two large reservations or colonies
in place of the old barrier line [Permanent Indian Frontier]. The colonies,
one in the north and one in the south, would open much of the western
border to white travel and settlement by relocating the tribes."59
Resembling the Spanish peace establishment, the U.S. reservation system became formal policy in the 1850S. In March 1850, Calhoun began to
urge federal officials to consider establishing a reservation system in the
Southwest. He thought that reservations of fifty square miles for the various
tribes would enable indigenous villages to feed themselves and abandon
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their habit of raiding. Certainly, the sentiment for fixed boundaries between
Native and Hispano/Anglo communities became widespread among New
Mexico's citizens and federal officials. In 1853 Gov. David Meriwether requested that the Indian commissioner allow him to offer treaties that would
terminate tribal title to land closest to White communities. At the same
time, the proposed treaties would remove the tribes as far away as possible
from Whites. In return for such one-sided treaties, Indians would be offered
annuities for the surrendered land. In April 1855, the U.S. Congress appropriated twenty-five thousand dollars for Meriwether to negotiate with southwestern tribes treaties that included fixed boundaries and, for the first time,
that urged them to accept confinement to reservations. 60
On 18 July 1855, Meriwether persuaded Navajo leaders to accept removal
to a reservation of seven thousand square miles between the Rios Colorado,
Grande, and Zuni. By agreeing to accept payments of up to $102,000 by
1876, the Navajos gave up about two-thirds of their former country and could
neither plant nor graze east of the reservation boundary. Most of the reservation land was mountainous with only about one hundred square miles suitable for cultivating crops. Moreover, the Navajos objected to demands that
they surrender seven of their men accused of murder. 61
The reservation system rolled forward in the Southwest. In 1855 the Utes
agreed to a treaty in which they ceded all their land to the United States,
except for a reservation area that hugged the northern New Mexico boundary and in which they promised to remain for one year. Meriwether negotiated four additional treaties with other Utes and Apaches. By the outbreak
of the Civil War, the Navajos had resumed raiding and the U.S. Army had
launched a campaign to break their resistance and place them on a reservation. The defeat of the Confederate invasion from Texas in spring 1862 freed
New Mexico volunteers to prosecute wars against the Apaches and Navajos.
During the fall of 1862, in combination with California volunteers, New
Mexican federal forces defeated the Mescalero Apaches and forced them
onto the Bosque Redondo reservation. Repeatedly invading Navajo land
between 1863 and 1865, the New Mexican troops rounded up Navajos and
placed them at Bosque Redondo, which contained 8,354 Navajos by 1865.
However, this federal experiment in Native acculturation failed: the
Mescaleros fled back to their own territory in 1865, and hundreds of Navajos
died of starvation and disease.
The Treaty of 1868 between the U.S. government and the Navajos marked
the beginning of a new Navajo era because it set aside for their exclusive use

WINTER 2005

RICHMOND ~

79

a reservation of almost four million acres equally straddling northwestern
New Mexico and northeastern Arizona. Article 2 mandated that "other
friendly tribes or individual Indians" could live on the reservation but farming "shall cease to be held in common," while children would be compelled to accept mandatory education from resident instructors. As the
removal of the Navajos from the Bosque Redondo began, a temporary reservation was set up at Ojo Caliente in 1870 for the Apaches because it was a
fertile, well-watered region. As the reservations became institutionalized on
an official basis after the Civil War, they represented the end of indigenous
autonomy in the once Permanent Indian Frontier. 62

Conclusion
Certainly the U.S.-Mexico War resulted in important consequences for
American Indians in the Southwest. Among its most fundamental but often
overlooked results, the war destroyed the final legal barriers to permanent
tribal homelands and enabled the encroachment of Whites on indigenous
lands. Some Native American tribes, such as the Apaches, saw their traditional homelands split apart by the U.S.-Mexico treaty line articulated in
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, but they kept their people united
with frequent international border crossings. The U.S.-Mexican conflict
opened the land 'previously held by Spain and Mexico to U.S. possession
and development. Success in reaching quick accords with Navajos and other
indigenous peoples enabled the U.S. military units to focus on and crush
Mexican forces, culminating in a decisive victory at Embudo, which secured New Mexico on a permanent basis. The early experiences of the U.S.
treaties in New Mexico had greater ramifications for subsequent treaty making with indigenous peoples throughout the West for the next forty years.
Compared to the small militia utilized by Spain and Mexico, U.S. troops
and volunteers were well-equipped and adequately provisioned. In contrast
to the Spanish and Mexican policy of remaining neutral or actively encouraging fights between various tribes, the United States decided to station
sufficient troops to crush any alliance between Nuevomexicanos and
Comanches as well as any internal war between indigenous nations that
would disrupt New Mexico Territory. The civilian population eventually
was prohibited from taking reprisals against indigenous raiders, which they
often took during the Spanish and Mexican periods, for now the federal
government sought to supervise all military activity in the Southwest.
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Reservations illustrate the isolation and subjugation of Native Americans
in New Mexico. In other regions of the United States, the reservation policy
was motivated largely by efforts to free Native lands for White settlement, to
provide areas where indigenous peoples could better be programmed for
assimilation, and to protect them from White encroachment as well as new
vices. In New Mexico, reservation policy differed because the U.S.-Mexican
conflict necessitated neutralizing the possibility of any anticipated indigenous alliance with Mexico. After the war, U.S. policy concentrated on
minimizing intratribal unity. Partly for that reason, the Utes were removed
from New Mexico to their present reservation in Colorado. The weakening
of indigenous ties had economic ramifications as well. Trade between indigenous New Mexican tribes and Plains Indians made New Mexico an
outlet for goods and livestock stolen from the central and southern plains.
But this comanchero trade ended by the 1870s, when the U.S. Army succeeded in placing the Comanches and Apaches on reservations. By then,
the southern buffalo herd had been slaughtered, and the southern plains
tribes lost their primary means of economic autonomy.
Finally, U.S. officials had learned various lessons from Spain and Mexico.
The United States consolidated its victory in New Mexico by adopting missionary efforts, although on a much smaller scale than had the Spanish.
Waves of Protestant missionaries soon arrived and offered medical, educational, and religious benefits that eventually won over sizeable portions of
New Mexico's indigenous nations by the end of the nineteenth century.63
The Spanish establecimiento de paz became the prototype for subsequent
reservations throughout the western United States. With Mexico, Sec. of
State Anthony Butler negotiated an 1832 treaty requiring military escorts
between Missouri and Santa Fe. 64 From 1821 to 1846, the early years of the
Santa Fe trade, federal authorities in Washington, D.C., probably acquired
a basic understanding of how Spanish and early Mexican governments established treaties with Indians in New Mexico. Like Mexico, the United
States never committed enough military force in New Mexico to overwhelm
indigenous resistance in a few years. Fortunately for the new territorial officials during the U.S.-Mexico War, however, the Navajos and Apaches considered the North Americans more as potential allies against the Mexicans
and decided to negotiate with that objective in mind. Once the war with
Mexico ended, the determination to avoid further indigenous raids motivated Mexican leaders to insist that the United States accept responsibility
for halting hostile Indian attacks as part of Article 11 of the Treaty of
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Guadalupe Hidalgo. As a testimony to the durability of conflict between
Native Americans and their foes, the United States persuaded Mexico to
accept deletion of Article 11 upon ratification of the Gadsden Treaty.65 Unlike Mexico and Spain, the United States hesitated to assimilate its indigenous population, not bestowing citizenship until 1924Notes
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